Chris Port Blog #261. God’s Null Hypothesis: The Banana Skin on the Pavement…

© Chris Port, 23^rd May 2011

I’m picking up a lot of philosophical chaff on Facebook which is cluttering up the atheism/theism debate with pseudo-logical tinfoil. The Null ‘Default’ Hypothesis that “there is no God” seems to be making some glaring ‘category errors’…

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As a gentle way in, let’s consider an easily refuted null hypothesis with some metaphysical implications…

Null/Alternative Hypothesis 1

Null Hypothesis: Nothing physically exists.

Alternative Hypothesis: Some things physically exist.

Definition of physical existence: Observable particles which have mass.

Data measurement: Mass.

Prediction: Any competent scientist should be able to devise a repeatable experiment that measures mass.

Conclusion: The null hypothesis is rejected. The alternative hypothesis is validated. Some things physically exist.

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Now that we’ve verified some things exist, let’s consider something a bit more tricky…

Null/Alternative Hypothesis 2

Null Hypothesis: There is no God.

Alternative Hypothesis: There is a God.

Scientific definition of God: Supernatural entity that has physical existence (or, at least, a physical effect), including observable particles which have mass.

Data measurement: Mass and/or physical effect.

Prediction: There is no conceivable experiment to measure the mass of a supernatural entity since something supernatural would ‘exist’ beyond nature and the observable universe. From a positivist perspective, it is unclear what (if anything) is actually meant by the term ‘exist’ here.

The lesser criterion of ‘physical effect’ is more measurable, but only if we know what particular effect to look for. In the case of black holes, astronomers look for Hawking’s radiation and gravitational ‘invisible man’ wobbles in observable phenomena.

However, in the case of God, since the putative causal entity remains invisible, without scale or location, it is impossible to suggest any particular focus of study. What physical effect would we be looking for? In a very big universe, this practically scuppers any experiment before it leaves the mind’s dry dock.

Looking to future developments, a ‘Grand Unified Theory’ would (at first glance) appear to solve the problem of ontology. Such a Theory of Everything would remove the need to look for any effect by default (since all physical effects would be accounted for, there would be nothing for a ‘God of the gaps’ to do).

Conclusion 1: Since it is impossible to design an experiment to test the null hypothesis, the null hypothesis must always remain unvalidated. The same conclusion holds for the alternative hypothesis. However, this is not the same as saying that both hypotheses are equivalent.

Citing the principle of Ockham’s Razor, a competent scientist would allocate the balance of probability to the null hypothesis as this makes the fewest assumptions. In essence, God is just over-complicating things. The simplest explanation is not always the correct one or the best one, but making an explanation needlessly complicated is like using calculus to catch a ball (not particularly helpful).

The creation of the natural universe is capable of mostly consistent explanation within the limits set by the Big Bang and the Uncertainty Principle. Scientific explanations do not require the existence of a God, so the null hypothesis is more probable unless contradicted by new and observable phenomena (which, I would say, are unlikely).

A competent scientist should therefore conclude that there is no valid reason to believe in a God. Atheism is a sensible default position, and any further debate should put the alternative hypothesis (theism) to the test instead.

Conclusion 2: There is an underlying flaw in the methodology here. All the competent scientist has done is to propose a definition for God that meets their test criteria (physical existence, or effect, including mass). However, this definition immediately fails without being tested.

First, there is no experiment or measurable data. In essence, the scientist has no idea what to look for or how to look for it.

Second, some theists would reject the positivist definition of existence in God’s instance. They may reasonably claim that their definition of God is closer to metaphysics than physics and should therefore be tested by ontological criteria.

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For example, consider the following critique of another flawed null/alternative hypothesis that is demonstrably unfit for purpose:

Null/Alternative Hypothesis 3

Null Hypothesis: I do not exist.

Alternative Hypothesis: I exist.

Scientific definition of “I”: A conscious, self-aware, rational entity with a continuous identity that has physical existence, including observable particles which have mass.

Data measurement: Thought and mass

Prediction: Any competent scientist should be able to devise a repeatable experiment that measures mass. The problem lies in the ‘thinking’ bit…

At first glance, this part of the experiment would appear to be the most self-evident. Sceptical thinkers have long trusted Descartes’ rational “Cogito ergo sum” (“I think therefore I am”) as a bedrock of certainty in a universe which plays tricks on the senses. Science, however, has shown this certainty to be profoundly wrong.

Consciousness is an ‘emergent property’ of particles and processes which are, in themselves, insentient. Physically, there is no such thing as “I”. That is not to say that “I” do not have physical mass. It is just to say that "I think therefore I am" infers too much. While 'existence' is a prerequisite for thought, identity is not. Who, or what, is "I"? Do new thoughts create new identities? Are you the same person that you were? These are clearly metaphysical questions rather than scientific ones.

Scientifically, it would be more correct to say "A thought, therefore something having it". "I" is a gestalt here rather than a singular entity. In some ways, “I” is an illusion, a biochemical bundle of sensations which combine to produce an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. The atoms of a living man and the atoms of a dead man are exactly the same. The only difference between the living and the dead is in how the parts work together. There is no ‘ghost in the machine’. There is only the machine.  So, all that “I” actually refers to is the processes rather than the object.

“I” is just a label we give to bio-mechanistic processes to link roiling thoughts together in a useful (survivable) way. Otherwise, we'd just be incoherent neural connections babbling like madmen (as indeed I often am on a good night down the pub...)

The above example, while facetious, demonstrates the inappropriateness of using scientific methodology to debate existential propositions such as “I”.

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If a theist claimed that God had physical existence, then science would rightly require empirical evidence. In this event, I predict that the theist claim would fail.

If a theist claimed that ‘God’ is a label (a gestalt, analogous to the earlier “I”) encompassing various metaphysical phenomena such as ethics, aesthetics and meaning, science would quite rightly pass the buck to the philosophers as there is nothing to be physically tested. I’m not going to predict the conclusions of philosophers here (it would obviously depend on which types you asked) but any competent philosopher would quickly realize that the null/alternative hypothesis model is unfit for purpose when considering a metaphysical God. The overwhelming consideration is what is meant by God.

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Conclusion 3: A supernatural God who does not interfere in the natural world has no place in scientific debate. As far as science is concerned, anything without physical mass or effect in the natural world doesn’t exist. But does science have a place in metaphysical debates about God?

Scientists are as entitled to their beliefs and opinions as any other human being. But if they want to get involved in philosophical debate, they would do well to read up on Wittgenstein. It concerns me that there are so many pseudo-scientific public pronouncements on the subject of God that actually constrict the debate rather than clarifying the subject.

Reductionism makes for good science but lousy philosophy. Far too many logical errors are weakening atheistic arguments with glaring ‘category errors’ such as the misappropriated null/alternative hypothesis model. If philosophers decided to plan a manned mission to Mars, measuring the distance in bananas, scientists across the world would rightly think that the eggheads had gone… bananas… Similarly, when scientists decide to nullify a metaphysical concept by measuring its physical extension (none), philosophers see a banana skin on the pavement…